Republic Act No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Thirteenth Congress Second Regular Session Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand and five. Republic Act No. 9346 June 24, 2006 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed. (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided, however, That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitutions. SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of general circulation. Approved, FRANKLIN  DRILON President of the Senate JOSE DE VENECIA JR. Speaker of the House of Representatives This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2254 and House Bill No. 4826 was finally passed but the Senate and the House of Representative on July 7, 2006.   OSCAR G.YABES Secretary of Senate ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General House of Represenatives Approved: June 24, 2006 GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO President of the Philippines Source: The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation ­­­

 

Moving the Wheels of Justice Forward

Another high-profile indictee on PDAF scam, Senator Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, has surrendered after the Sandiganbayan’s fifth division issued the warrant for his arrest. As it was with the first, Senator Revilla, Estrada’s surrender was NOT without fanfare at all: he surrendered to his father, and former President and now Manila Mayor Joseph Ejecrcito “Erap”Estrada. Veteran counsel for Estrada, Atty. Jose Flaminiano, the same counsel who represented the elder Estrada in his plunder case in 2001, where he was convicted but got a helter-skelter pardon from former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, said Jinggoy surrendered to his father, Erap, who is a person in authority.

 No doubt Erap is a person in authority. But Jinggoy surrendering to him, his father, and with whom he stood as co-accused for the same offense of plunder in 2001, though later acquitted, can hardly be mistaken as innocent, but suggests it was calculated to dramatize this otherwise nonevent, and to draw attention.

The high profile indictees seem poised to attempt to outdo one another in their plunder chronicle. Revilla, clad in shirt with a bible passage printed on it, led a 10-vehicle convoy to the Sandiganbayan for his surrender on Friday morning. He was then escorted by CIDG bigwigs Malonga and Fajardo to the PNP Custodial Center at Camp Crame after the Sandiganbayan’s First Division signed his commitment order to be detained at the PNP Custodial Center as requested in his motion.

Notably, both Revilla and Estrada had their booking rituals done at the PNP Multipurpose Hall, as if to allow a complete and comfortable coverage of this part of this saga. Clearly, the media has dramatized these events for their own interest. Incidentally, however, its willingness to do all to get coverage to air, this time, seems to have worked better in Revilla’s and Estrada’s interest, who are obviously making a campaign, on the proposition that they are being persecuted for their opposition to the administration, out of this processes to hold them accountable for grave wrongdoings.

These are early signs that these cases are going to drag past this administration, and then no one knows where they will lead after.

In the meantime, when all is said and done, one could breathe a sigh of relief, though, that the wheels of justice, no matter that it is hobbled by what many believe as chicaneries and unnecessary fanfare, move forward.

Revilla knows exactly what he is doing and who he is playing his theatrics to.

A month before the controversy on PDAF or pork barrel marks its first anniversary in July—Inquirer first reported on it in July last year—one of the first indictees, a  sitting senator, Senator Ramon Revilla, has surrendered after the graft court, the Sandiganbayan (SB), has issued the warrant for his arrest, and is now detained at the PNP Custodial Center at CIDG in Camp Crame. The arrests or surrenders of the two other high-profile indictees, fellow sitting senators Senators Juan Ponce Enrile and Jinggoy Estrada, are expected to follow and take place on Monday, at the earliest, or anytime within next week.

The three, along with tens more, are among the first batch of personalities charged of plunder and several counts of graft in connection with the systematic and scheming allocation of pork barrel funds—intended to alleviate the plight of farmers affected by devastating typhoons that hit the country in the last decade, among others—to bogus non-government organizations (NGOs), eight or so of which were owned by alleged PDAF scam mastermind Janet Lim-Napoles. Napoles herself is under detention at a Police special forces camp in Sta. Rosa Laguna, south of capital Manila, for illegal detention of former employee and cousin-turned whistle blower Benhur Luy.

The arrest, or the issuance for its warrant, which followed SB’s determination of probable cause, came on the heels of charges of selective justice by the opposition led by Vice-President Jejomay Binay, a confessed and strong contender for the presidency in the 2016 national elections. DOJ secretary, however, calls it “a milestone in Philippine justice system,” pointing that it is the first time that a number of lawmakers, congressmen and senators alike, are expected to stand trial for plunder of taxpayers’ money.

Depending on who you ask, the reaction is extremely for or against these developments.

One won’t miss though the theatrics put up by Senator Revilla for days now leading to his surrender yesterday after the SB issued the warrant for his arrest. He has gone around the country, as though he were on a campaign—but it is clear he was making a campaign out of it—portraying himself as a victim of the administration’s demolition job to frustrate his presidential ambitions. He has made known to the public his intention to seek the country’s highest office in the 2016 national elections.

While many in educated middle and upper class of society doubt whether anyone cares about what Senator Revilla says, or whether anyone believes what he says other than take it with a grain of salt, and many labeling his whole endeavor as making them queasy and squeamish, Revilla knows exactly what he is doing and who he is playing his theatrics to—the masses which translates to the poor, mostly uneducated or undereducated, and mostly voters.

His hopes, I surmise, and exploiting Philippines’s legal crack allowing suspected criminals, at least before conviction by final judgment, to seek and hold elective office, is he will not be convicted by final judgment before the 2016 national elections, thus qualifying him to run for president. If he wins, which is credibly possible, given his considerable popularity with the masses being a local action movie hero for decades, he could influence the outcome of his case by placing his political and legal stalwarts in the right places, especially the JBC, which is responsible for nominating and shortlisting candidates for justices of the Supreme Court, whom the president ultimately appoints.

This is his last card. If this plays out right, and that is why he is carefully orchestrating it—playing the roles of a director and a lead actor—we will have a prisoner waltzing his way out of detention to occupy the highest office of the land.  Revilla feels this in his gut. If you notice, this is the stuff his kinds of movie are made of.

Republic Act No. 7080; AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER

Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Eighth Congress   Republic Act No. 7080 July 12, 1991 AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term - a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election or contract. b) Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates otherwise. d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: 1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; 2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned; 3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; 4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; 5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or 6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. See Section 2 As amended by Section 12 of RA No.7659 Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00),–now fifty million pesos under Section 12 of amendatory law RA 7659—shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. Section 3. Competent Court - Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits - Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Section 6. Prescription of Crimes - The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. However, the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. Section 7. Separability of Provisions - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. Section 8. Scope - This Act shall not apply to or affect pending prosecutions or proceedings, or those which may be instituted under Executive Order No. 1, issued and promulgated on February 28, 1986. Section 9. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. Approved: July 12, 1991

 

Can a witness who has not been named by a Party in his or her Pre-trial Brief testify at trial?

While the Rules of Court require parties to submit pre-trial briefs, which must contain, among others, the number and names of witnesses they intend to present, and the nature and purpose of their testimonies, said pre-trial briefs almost always contain a reservation for presentation of additional evidence and witnesses. In effect, circumventing the requirement of limiting the witnesses one can put to the stand to those named in the pre-trial briefs, thus naming them and apprising the opposing party of their impending testimony prior to trial proper to avoid surprises.

But can a party object to the presentation of, or can a court validly exclude, a witness that was not named in the pre-trial brief?

This is the issue resolved by the Court in the case below.

In this case, the petitioner brings to Court on pure question of law the issue of whether the court can prevent a witness who has not been named in the pre-trial brief from taking to the stand.

Pre-trial* is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial without the consent of the parties affected.

The Facts

The facts are undisputed. The present Petition arose from a Complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property, accounting and damages filed against herein petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City.

Before the commencement of trial, the court a quo sent a Notice of Pre-trial Conference, stating in part: "The parties are WARNED that witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial, and documents not marked as exhibits at the pre-trial, except those not then available or existing, may be barred admission in evidence." ⁴ (Emphasis supplied.)

In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner averred that he would be presenting six witnesses, but he did not name them. After the pre-trial conference, the court a quo issued a Pre-trial Order stating that the petitioner would present six witnesses and specifying the hearing dates for the said purpose. ⁵

Trial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case below, presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, petitioner called Antonia Tiu as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondents objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because petitioner had failed to name her in his Pre-trial Brief. Sustaining respondents, the lower court then issued its assailed Orders.

The Court’s ruling.

We rule for petitioner.

Main Issue:

Can Petitioner's Unnamed Witnesses Testify?

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. xxx

In a pre-trial, the judge is not a passive arbiter; he is an active participant who constantly seeks avenues through which trial can be expedited, simplified or even avoided by a resort to alternative modes of dispute resolution. The role and the authority of the trial court during pre-trial has been described by the Court in this wise: ¹⁶

Again, it is unquestionably within the trial court's power to require the parties at the pre-trial to (a) state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, their names addresses, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give, as well as to (b) formally disclose the number of the documents and things to be submitted and to furnish copies thereof or a short description of the nature of each. The tenor or character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the writings to be adduced at the trial being thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes reasonably feasible to require the parties to state the number of trial dates that each will need to put on his case, and maybe bring about a further agreement as to some other controverted facts, or an amendment of the pleadings, etc.

What needs stressing is that the parties as well as the trial court must realize that the parties are obliged not only to make formal identification and specification of the issues and of their proofs, as above described [—] indeed, there is no reason why the Court may not oblige the parties to set these matters down in the separate writings and submit them to the Court prior to the pre-trial, and then to discuss, refine and embody the matters agreed upon in a single document at or shortly after the pre-trial — but also and equally as peremptorily, to directly address and discuss with sincerity and candor and in entire good faith each of the other subjects enumerated in Section 1, Rule 20, i.e., the "possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to arbitration," the "advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner," and "such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action," inclusive of a resort to the modes of discovery.

In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court therein, it is evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect. ¹⁷

In the present case, the Notice of Pre-trial Conference warned the parties that "witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial." ¹⁸ In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner merely stated that he intended to present four (6) witnesses "whose direct testimony will be finished in an average of one (1) hour each." He further requested four hearing days to present his evidence. ¹⁹ Evidently, he did not comply with the above rules and the Notice of Pre-trial Conference, because he failed to give the names of his witnesses and the synopsis of their testimonies.

In his Pre-trial Order, ²⁰ however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply provided that "[t]he defendant will present six witnesses." It made no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named. Significantly, it also stated that "plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses," without however naming them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as plaintiffs before the trial court) to present witnesses, it necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to petitioner.

Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses "shall control the subsequent course of action." The court a quo proceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioner's unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules.

 

Silvestre Tiu vs. Daniel Middleton, et al., G.R. No. 134998 July 19, 1999

Read the full text of the case here.

 

 

Jurisdiction over actions involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

Prior to enactment of R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of MTCs, there were no issues on jurisdiction over cases involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,⁴⁷ as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended).

"Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691⁴⁸ in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs."

Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."⁴⁹

In the case below, the Court is called upon via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction over an action for reconveyance. Petitioner believes that a cause of action for reconveyance is embraced in the classification of cases considered “involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein xxx.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the action is more akin to cases the subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, Respondents aver that because Petitioners pray for recovery of the value of the felled trees, the value should likewise, therefore, be included and the totality of the amount should thus be made the basis in determining jurisdiction, and because the value of the lot in question plus the value of the felled trees combined exceeds twenty thousand pesos, jurisdictions vests in the RTC.

The Court’s ruling.

            Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.²⁸ It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.²⁹ To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.³⁰

The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.³¹ An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.³² There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner³³ and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.³⁴ (italics added)

The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:

(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or possession;³⁵

(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;³⁶

(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];³⁷

(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously filed³⁸ [their respective patent applications and were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];³⁹

(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;⁴⁰ and

(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.⁴¹

These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.⁴²

Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

x x x.

In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00, to wit:

Civil Case	No. Lot No.	Assessed Value
5188	6195	P1,030.00
5433	6196-A	4,500.00
5434	6196-B	4,340.00
	7529-A	1,880.00.43

Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.

 

On Respondent’s contention that the issue in this case is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court explains:

Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance⁴⁴ of or for cancellation of title⁴⁵ to or to quiet title⁴⁶ over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,⁴⁷ as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691⁴⁸ in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."⁴⁹

The cases of Raymundo v. CA⁵⁰ and Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,⁵¹ relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."

Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA⁵² and Santos v. CA⁵³ cited by the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.

Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed.⁵⁴ In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.

Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. Namely: Teresita Concha-Paran, Valeriano P. Concha, Jr., et al. vs. Spouses Gregorio J. Lumocso¹, et al., G.R. No. 158121 December 12, 2007

Read the full text of the case here.