Can a witness who has not been named by a Party in his or her Pre-trial Brief testify at trial?

While the Rules of Court require parties to submit pre-trial briefs, which must contain, among others, the number and names of witnesses they intend to present, and the nature and purpose of their testimonies, said pre-trial briefs almost always contain a reservation for presentation of additional evidence and witnesses. In effect, circumventing the requirement of limiting the witnesses one can put to the stand to those named in the pre-trial briefs, thus naming them and apprising the opposing party of their impending testimony prior to trial proper to avoid surprises.

But can a party object to the presentation of, or can a court validly exclude, a witness that was not named in the pre-trial brief?

This is the issue resolved by the Court in the case below.

In this case, the petitioner brings to Court on pure question of law the issue of whether the court can prevent a witness who has not been named in the pre-trial brief from taking to the stand.

Pre-trial* is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial without the consent of the parties affected.

The Facts

The facts are undisputed. The present Petition arose from a Complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property, accounting and damages filed against herein petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City.

Before the commencement of trial, the court a quo sent a Notice of Pre-trial Conference, stating in part: "The parties are WARNED that witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial, and documents not marked as exhibits at the pre-trial, except those not then available or existing, may be barred admission in evidence." ⁴ (Emphasis supplied.)

In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner averred that he would be presenting six witnesses, but he did not name them. After the pre-trial conference, the court a quo issued a Pre-trial Order stating that the petitioner would present six witnesses and specifying the hearing dates for the said purpose. ⁵

Trial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case below, presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, petitioner called Antonia Tiu as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondents objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because petitioner had failed to name her in his Pre-trial Brief. Sustaining respondents, the lower court then issued its assailed Orders.

The Court’s ruling.

We rule for petitioner.

Main Issue:

Can Petitioner's Unnamed Witnesses Testify?

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. xxx

In a pre-trial, the judge is not a passive arbiter; he is an active participant who constantly seeks avenues through which trial can be expedited, simplified or even avoided by a resort to alternative modes of dispute resolution. The role and the authority of the trial court during pre-trial has been described by the Court in this wise: ¹⁶

Again, it is unquestionably within the trial court's power to require the parties at the pre-trial to (a) state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, their names addresses, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give, as well as to (b) formally disclose the number of the documents and things to be submitted and to furnish copies thereof or a short description of the nature of each. The tenor or character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the writings to be adduced at the trial being thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes reasonably feasible to require the parties to state the number of trial dates that each will need to put on his case, and maybe bring about a further agreement as to some other controverted facts, or an amendment of the pleadings, etc.

What needs stressing is that the parties as well as the trial court must realize that the parties are obliged not only to make formal identification and specification of the issues and of their proofs, as above described [—] indeed, there is no reason why the Court may not oblige the parties to set these matters down in the separate writings and submit them to the Court prior to the pre-trial, and then to discuss, refine and embody the matters agreed upon in a single document at or shortly after the pre-trial — but also and equally as peremptorily, to directly address and discuss with sincerity and candor and in entire good faith each of the other subjects enumerated in Section 1, Rule 20, i.e., the "possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to arbitration," the "advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner," and "such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action," inclusive of a resort to the modes of discovery.

In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court therein, it is evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect. ¹⁷

In the present case, the Notice of Pre-trial Conference warned the parties that "witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial." ¹⁸ In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner merely stated that he intended to present four (6) witnesses "whose direct testimony will be finished in an average of one (1) hour each." He further requested four hearing days to present his evidence. ¹⁹ Evidently, he did not comply with the above rules and the Notice of Pre-trial Conference, because he failed to give the names of his witnesses and the synopsis of their testimonies.

In his Pre-trial Order, ²⁰ however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply provided that "[t]he defendant will present six witnesses." It made no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named. Significantly, it also stated that "plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses," without however naming them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as plaintiffs before the trial court) to present witnesses, it necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to petitioner.

Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses "shall control the subsequent course of action." The court a quo proceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioner's unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules.

 

Silvestre Tiu vs. Daniel Middleton, et al., G.R. No. 134998 July 19, 1999

Read the full text of the case here.

 

 

Jurisdiction over actions involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

Prior to enactment of R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of MTCs, there were no issues on jurisdiction over cases involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,⁴⁷ as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended).

"Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691⁴⁸ in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs."

Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."⁴⁹

In the case below, the Court is called upon via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction over an action for reconveyance. Petitioner believes that a cause of action for reconveyance is embraced in the classification of cases considered “involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein xxx.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the action is more akin to cases the subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, Respondents aver that because Petitioners pray for recovery of the value of the felled trees, the value should likewise, therefore, be included and the totality of the amount should thus be made the basis in determining jurisdiction, and because the value of the lot in question plus the value of the felled trees combined exceeds twenty thousand pesos, jurisdictions vests in the RTC.

The Court’s ruling.

            Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.²⁸ It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.²⁹ To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.³⁰

The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.³¹ An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.³² There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner³³ and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.³⁴ (italics added)

The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:

(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or possession;³⁵

(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;³⁶

(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];³⁷

(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously filed³⁸ [their respective patent applications and were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];³⁹

(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;⁴⁰ and

(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.⁴¹

These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.⁴²

Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

x x x.

In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00, to wit:

Civil Case	No. Lot No.	Assessed Value
5188	6195	P1,030.00
5433	6196-A	4,500.00
5434	6196-B	4,340.00
	7529-A	1,880.00.43

Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.

 

On Respondent’s contention that the issue in this case is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court explains:

Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance⁴⁴ of or for cancellation of title⁴⁵ to or to quiet title⁴⁶ over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,⁴⁷ as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691⁴⁸ in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."⁴⁹

The cases of Raymundo v. CA⁵⁰ and Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,⁵¹ relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."

Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA⁵² and Santos v. CA⁵³ cited by the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.

Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed.⁵⁴ In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.

Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. Namely: Teresita Concha-Paran, Valeriano P. Concha, Jr., et al. vs. Spouses Gregorio J. Lumocso¹, et al., G.R. No. 158121 December 12, 2007

Read the full text of the case here.

 

Who may Sign Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping on Behalf of a Corporation?

Generally, one needs a board resolution authorizing him or her to file an action on behalf of the corporation in order that he or she may validly sign the complaint and the accompanying Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping. But jurisprudence has provided some exceptions. They are the issues, among others, resolved in the case discussed below.

It has been the constant holding of this Court in cases instituted by corporations that an individual corporate officer cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors pursuant to Section 23, in relation to Section 25 of the Corporation Code which clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. However, we have in many cases recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum-shopping. Some of these cases were enumerated in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue²⁷ which was cited by the appellate court:

In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an "employment specialist" who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."²⁸ (Citations omitted.)

While we agree with petitioner that in Cagayan Valley, the requisite board resolution was submitted though belatedly unlike in the instant case, this Court still recognizes the authority of Mr. Erece, Jr. to sign the verification and certification on behalf of PNCC sans a board resolution or secretary’s certificate as we have allowed in Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan,²⁹ one of the cases cited in Cagayan Valley. In Pfizer, the Court ruled as valid the verification signed by an employment specialist as she was in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition³⁰ despite the fact that no board resolution authorizing her was ever submitted by Pfizer, Inc. even belatedly. We believe that like the employment specialist in Pfizer, Mr. Erece, Jr. too, as head of the Personnel Services Department of PNCC, was in a position to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared in good faith and are true and correct.

Even assuming that the verification in the appeal filed by PNCC is defective, it is well settled that rules of procedure in labor cases maybe relaxed. As provided in Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended, "rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." Moreover, the requirement of verification is merely formal and not jurisdictional. As held in Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc.³¹:

As to the defective verification in the appeal memorandum before the NLRC, the same liberality applies. After all, the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the noncompliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court or tribunal may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.³²

Roy D. P Asos vs. Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394 July 3, 2013

Read the full text of the case here.

Tabular Presentation of Distinction Between Criminal and Civil Procedures

Distinction between Criminal and Civil Procedure:

Criminal Procedure	Civil Procedure
Presumption of innocence applies	Presumption of innocence does NOT apply
In criminal negligence, there is no presumption of negligence, because it is a criminal case, though committed by culpa.	There is presumption of negligence in civil case: Arts. 2184, 2185, 2188, 1756, 1735, common carriers.
Prosecutor has the burden of proof	Both have the duty to prove claim & defenses
Quantum of evidence is proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty	Quantum of evidence is preponderance or superior weight of evidence; Administrative: substantial evidence or adequate to support a conlusion; Quantum of evid not found in the rules but in jurisprudence: US vs Purugganan (bail), Provisional Govt of HK vs Judge Olalia: Clear & convincing evid – below proof beyond reasonable doubt but above preponderance of evid. It is used to destroy rebuttable presumption, to disbar a lawyer, evidence in bail hearing, and in extradition cases;
Doctrine of double jeopardy	Doctrine of res judicata
Cause of action is owned by the State: People of the Phils V. Juan dela Cruz	Cause of action by private party to a contract Indl v indl
2 liabs are litigated: criminal & civil (art 100 RPC)	Only one liability is litigated: i.e. civil.
Concept of bail applies	Concept of bail does NOT apply
Concept of arrest applies	Concept of arrest does NOT apply
Concept of Prelim Investigation (PI) applies	Concept of PI does NOT apply
Penalty is or includes imprisonment	No imprisonment, instead damages, spec perf,
Pre-trial (mandatory). The court sets for pre-trial after arraignment, and w/in 30 days after jurisdiction is acquired over the accused. (rule 118)	Pre-trial (mandatory). Plaintiff moves (as a duty) for pre-trial ex-parte after last pleading has been filed (Rule 18) Other term for pre-trial is prelim conference. In fact this term is used in rules on summary proc.
There may also be pre-trial on appeal (CA)r47,r48, SC r56,
Amicable settlement of crim liab is NOT allowed, only the civil aspect of a criminal case	1st purpose of pre-trial is amicable settlement
An offer to compromise criminal liability may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt (S27(2), R130) Criminal liability that may be compromised is that which arise from culpa (crim negl) or quasi offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised	An offer to compromise is not an admission of liability, & is not admissible in evidence against the offeror (S27(1), R130)
AM 03-1-09SC All agreements or admissions made or entered into during pre-trial conference must be reduced in writing, signed by the accused & counsel. Otherwise they cannot be used against the accused.	Agreements must be signed by parties and counsels, but No such provision that if not signed they can’t be used against a party
Summoned to attend are the pros & defense counsel, NOT the plaintiff or defendant. Offender could be in jail; victim (in case of homicide) is dead.	Plaintiff absent at pre-trial; court may dismiss complaint; Defendant absent at pre-trial; court may allow presentation of evidence ex-parte
Before entering a plea : Motion for BoP (S9,R116) in order to plead & prepare for trial; Question the legality of arrest, or the absence of Preliminary Investigation; Move for suspension of arraignment, on grounds: The accused is of unsound mind; There is a petition for review filed w/the DOJ Sec.	Motion for BoP in order to prepare a responsive pleading