Can a witness who has not been named by a Party in his or her Pre-trial Brief testify at trial?

While the Rules of Court require parties to submit pre-trial briefs, which must contain, among others, the number and names of witnesses they intend to present, and the nature and purpose of their testimonies, said pre-trial briefs almost always contain a reservation for presentation of additional evidence and witnesses. In effect, circumventing the requirement of limiting the witnesses one can put to the stand to those named in the pre-trial briefs, thus naming them and apprising the opposing party of their impending testimony prior to trial proper to avoid surprises.

But can a party object to the presentation of, or can a court validly exclude, a witness that was not named in the pre-trial brief?

This is the issue resolved by the Court in the case below.

In this case, the petitioner brings to Court on pure question of law the issue of whether the court can prevent a witness who has not been named in the pre-trial brief from taking to the stand.

Pre-trial* is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial without the consent of the parties affected.

The Facts

The facts are undisputed. The present Petition arose from a Complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property, accounting and damages filed against herein petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City.

Before the commencement of trial, the court a quo sent a Notice of Pre-trial Conference, stating in part: "The parties are WARNED that witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial, and documents not marked as exhibits at the pre-trial, except those not then available or existing, may be barred admission in evidence." ⁴ (Emphasis supplied.)

In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner averred that he would be presenting six witnesses, but he did not name them. After the pre-trial conference, the court a quo issued a Pre-trial Order stating that the petitioner would present six witnesses and specifying the hearing dates for the said purpose. ⁵

Trial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case below, presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, petitioner called Antonia Tiu as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondents objected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because petitioner had failed to name her in his Pre-trial Brief. Sustaining respondents, the lower court then issued its assailed Orders.

The Court’s ruling.

We rule for petitioner.

Main Issue:

Can Petitioner's Unnamed Witnesses Testify?

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. xxx

In a pre-trial, the judge is not a passive arbiter; he is an active participant who constantly seeks avenues through which trial can be expedited, simplified or even avoided by a resort to alternative modes of dispute resolution. The role and the authority of the trial court during pre-trial has been described by the Court in this wise: ¹⁶

Again, it is unquestionably within the trial court's power to require the parties at the pre-trial to (a) state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, their names addresses, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give, as well as to (b) formally disclose the number of the documents and things to be submitted and to furnish copies thereof or a short description of the nature of each. The tenor or character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the writings to be adduced at the trial being thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes reasonably feasible to require the parties to state the number of trial dates that each will need to put on his case, and maybe bring about a further agreement as to some other controverted facts, or an amendment of the pleadings, etc.

What needs stressing is that the parties as well as the trial court must realize that the parties are obliged not only to make formal identification and specification of the issues and of their proofs, as above described [—] indeed, there is no reason why the Court may not oblige the parties to set these matters down in the separate writings and submit them to the Court prior to the pre-trial, and then to discuss, refine and embody the matters agreed upon in a single document at or shortly after the pre-trial — but also and equally as peremptorily, to directly address and discuss with sincerity and candor and in entire good faith each of the other subjects enumerated in Section 1, Rule 20, i.e., the "possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to arbitration," the "advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner," and "such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action," inclusive of a resort to the modes of discovery.

In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial court therein, it is evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect. ¹⁷

In the present case, the Notice of Pre-trial Conference warned the parties that "witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may not be allowed to testify at the trial." ¹⁸ In his Pre-trial Brief, petitioner merely stated that he intended to present four (6) witnesses "whose direct testimony will be finished in an average of one (1) hour each." He further requested four hearing days to present his evidence. ¹⁹ Evidently, he did not comply with the above rules and the Notice of Pre-trial Conference, because he failed to give the names of his witnesses and the synopsis of their testimonies.

In his Pre-trial Order, ²⁰ however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply provided that "[t]he defendant will present six witnesses." It made no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named. Significantly, it also stated that "plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses," without however naming them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as plaintiffs before the trial court) to present witnesses, it necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to petitioner.

Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses "shall control the subsequent course of action." The court a quo proceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioner's unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules.

 

Silvestre Tiu vs. Daniel Middleton, et al., G.R. No. 134998 July 19, 1999

Read the full text of the case here.

 

 

Jurisdiction over actions involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

Prior to enactment of R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of MTCs, there were no issues on jurisdiction over cases involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,⁴⁷ as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended).

"Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691⁴⁸ in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs."

Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."⁴⁹

In the case below, the Court is called upon via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction over an action for reconveyance. Petitioner believes that a cause of action for reconveyance is embraced in the classification of cases considered “involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein xxx.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the action is more akin to cases the subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, Respondents aver that because Petitioners pray for recovery of the value of the felled trees, the value should likewise, therefore, be included and the totality of the amount should thus be made the basis in determining jurisdiction, and because the value of the lot in question plus the value of the felled trees combined exceeds twenty thousand pesos, jurisdictions vests in the RTC.

The Court’s ruling.

            Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.²⁸ It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.²⁹ To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.³⁰

The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.³¹ An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.³² There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner³³ and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.³⁴ (italics added)

The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:

(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or possession;³⁵

(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;³⁶

(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];³⁷

(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously filed³⁸ [their respective patent applications and were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];³⁹

(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;⁴⁰ and

(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.⁴¹

These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.⁴²

Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

x x x.

In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00, to wit:

Civil Case	No. Lot No.	Assessed Value
5188	6195	P1,030.00
5433	6196-A	4,500.00
5434	6196-B	4,340.00
	7529-A	1,880.00.43

Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.

 

On Respondent’s contention that the issue in this case is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court explains:

Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance⁴⁴ of or for cancellation of title⁴⁵ to or to quiet title⁴⁶ over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,⁴⁷ as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691⁴⁸ in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."⁴⁹

The cases of Raymundo v. CA⁵⁰ and Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,⁵¹ relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."

Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA⁵² and Santos v. CA⁵³ cited by the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.

Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed.⁵⁴ In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.

Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. Namely: Teresita Concha-Paran, Valeriano P. Concha, Jr., et al. vs. Spouses Gregorio J. Lumocso¹, et al., G.R. No. 158121 December 12, 2007

Read the full text of the case here.

 

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the Complaint.

Determination of jurisdiction over a dispute sometimes gets dicey when by relationship of the parties a proposition in favor of one is conveniently apparent. Consider, for example, a case brought by employees against an employer questioning the validity of a provision in their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Without saying where the case is filed and without more, one reading this would be swayed to think that it is a labor dispute. But is it?

In the case below, a group of employees belonging to a union filed a case questioning the validity of a provision in their CBA. Does this, without more, make out a labor dispute, consequently giving the labor arbiter jurisdiction?

Here’s what the Court has to say:

“Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.¹⁴”

“Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.¹⁹”

 

Facts

On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement³ incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA.

Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:

A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:

x x x x

3. Compulsory Retirement

Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. x x x.

On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction⁷ with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-886, against respondent for the invalidity of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. The RTC set a hearing on petitioners' application for a TRO and, thereafter, required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

On August 9, 2004, the RTC issued an Order⁸ upholding its jurisdiction over the present case.

The RTC issued a TRO on August 10, 2004,⁹ enjoining the respondent for implementing Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.

Aggrieved, respondent, on October 8, 2004, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction¹² with the Court of Appeals (CA) praying that the order of the RTC, which denied its objection to its jurisdiction, be annuled and set aside for having been issued without and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The CA rendered a Decision, dated August 31, 2005, granting the respondent's petition, and ruled that:

WHEREFORE, the respondent court is by us declared to have NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW and, consequently, all the proceedings, orders and processes it has so far issued therein are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Respondent court is ordered to DISMISS its Civil Case No. 04-886.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,¹³ which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 7, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition assigning the following error:

THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER IS A LABOR DISPUTE OR GRIEVANCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.¹⁴

In the case at bar, the allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly show that petitioners' cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. The pertinent portion of the petition recites:

CAUSE OF ACTION

24. Petitioners have the constitutional right to fundamental equality with men under Section 14, Article II, 1987 of the Constitution and, within the specific context of this case, with the male cabin attendants of Philippine Airlines.

26. Petitioners have the statutory right to equal work and employment opportunities with men under Article 3, Presidential Decree No. 442, The Labor Code and, within the specific context of this case, with the male cabin attendants of Philippine Airlines.

27. It is unlawful, even criminal, for an employer to discriminate against women employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment solely on account of their sex under Article 135 of the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act No. 6725 or the Act Strengthening Prohibition on Discrimination Against Women.

28. This discrimination against Petitioners is likewise against the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereafter, "CEDAW"), a multilateral convention that the Philippines ratified in 1981. The Government and its agents, including our courts, not only must condemn all forms of discrimination against women, but must also implement measures towards its elimination.

29. This case is a matter of public interest not only because of Philippine Airlines' violation of the Constitution and existing laws, but also because it highlights the fact that twenty-three years after the Philippine Senate ratified the CEDAW, discrimination against women continues.

31. Section 114, Part A of the PAL-FASAP 2000-20005 CBA on compulsory retirement from service is invidiously discriminatory against and manifestly prejudicial to Petitioners because, they are compelled to retire at a lower age (fifty-five (55) relative to their male counterparts (sixty (60).

33. There is no reasonable, much less lawful, basis for Philippine Airlines to distinguish, differentiate or classify cabin attendants on the basis of sex and thereby arbitrarily set a lower compulsory retirement age of 55 for Petitioners for the sole reason that they are women.

37. For being patently unconstitutional and unlawful, Section 114, Part A of the PAL-FASAP 2000-2005 CBA must be declared invalid and stricken down to the extent that it discriminates against petitioner.

38. Accordingly, consistent with the constitutional and statutory guarantee of equality between men and women, Petitioners should be adjudged and declared entitled, like their male counterparts, to work until they are sixty (60) years old.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court:

c. after trial on the merits:

(I) declare Section 114, Part A of the PAL-FASAP 2000-2005 CBA INVALID, NULL and VOID to the extent that it discriminates against Petitioners; x x x x

From the petitioners' allegations and relief prayed for in its petition, it is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional. Here, the petitioners' primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.¹⁵ Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,¹⁶ and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.xxx

Patricia Halagueña, et al. vs. Philippine Airlines Incorporated, G.R. No. 172013 October 2, 2009

Read the full text of the case here.