When Resignation is Voluntary, and When Forced as to Amount to Constructive Dismissal.

We have heard a lot about forced resignation in the workplace. But just when is it indeed “forced” as to give rise to a cause of action for constructive dismissal? In the case below, the Petitioner contends she had been coerced to resign, thus she filed a case for illegal dismissal three years later.

Let’s examine the alleged statement of her boss (AVP), from which she deduced the coercion for her to resign from her position:

"MAG-RESIGN KANA AGAD KASI MAIIPIT KAMI,"

Brief Statement of Facts

“Petitioner Finina E. Vicente was employed by respondent Cinderella Marketing Corporation (Cinderella) as Management Coordinator in January 1990. Prior to her resignation in February 2000, she held the position of Consignment Operations Manager with a salary of P27,000.00 a month.⁵ She was tasked with the oversight, supervision and management of the Consignment Department dealing directly with Cinderella’s consignors.⁶

After some time, one of Cinderella’s suppliers complained about the unauthorized deductions from the net sales due them. Accordingly, an investigation was conducted and upon initial review of respondent’s business records, it appears that petitioner was among those involved in the irregular and fraudulent preparation and encashment of respondent’s corporate checks amounting to at least P500,000.00.⁸

Petitioner alleged that Mr. Tecson demanded her resignation on several occasions. On February 15, 2000, Mr. Tecson allegedly told her "MAG-RESIGN KANA AGAD KASI MAIIPIT KAMI," in the presence of Lizz Villafuerte, the Accounting Manager.⁹ As a result of this alleged force and intimidation, petitioner tendered her resignation letter.

On January 13, 2003, or three years after her resignation, petitioner filed a complaint against Cinderella alleging that her severance from employment was involuntary amounting to constructive dismissal.¹⁰” xxx

If you think the above utterance sounds like coercing the Petitioner to resign, the labor arbiter and the NLRC agree, thus:

“On October 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision¹² finding that petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Cinderella was not able to controvert petitioner’s assertion that she was forced to resign; that the resignation letter relied upon by respondent to show the voluntariness of the resignation was fabricated and without evidentiary weight since it does not bear petitioner’s signature; that there was no basis to terminate petitioner on the ground of loss of confidence since her involvement in the fraudulent transactions was doubtful as shown by the Confidential Memo clearing her of any liability. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Cinderella Marketing Corporation to:

1. pay complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement computed at one (1) month for every year of service in the amount of P270,000.00; and

2. pay complainant full backwages from the time she filed this complaint in the amount of P270,000.00.

SO ORDERED.¹³”

“On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that the statement of Mr. Tecson informing petitioner, to wit: "MAG-RESIGN KANA AGAD KASI MAIIPIT KAMI," was the proximate cause for petitioner’s decision to resign. Thus, the resignation cannot be deemed voluntary notwithstanding the execution of the two resignation letters.”

On petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, however, the Court of Appeals overthrows the concurrent findings of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC:

“On August 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision finding that the totality of evidence on record showed that petitioner voluntarily resigned from her employment; that the subsequent acts of petitioner belie the claim of constructive dismissal; that after the alleged forced resignation, petitioner attended the meetings concerning her involvement in the anomalous transactions and even arranged for the settlement of her consequent liabilities as may be determined during the investigation; that the belated filing of the complaint militates against petitioner because it is hardly expected from an aggrieved employee to wait three years before instituting the case.

The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent’s complaint a quo is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.¹⁴”

Petitioner took to the Supreme Court with this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 raising the following issues:

“I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT.¹⁵

Petitioner asserts the following: (1) The factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are not correctible by certiorari and are binding on the Supreme Court in the absence of any showing that they are completely without any support in the evidence on record. (2) In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proof that the resignation is voluntary and not the product of coercion, intimidation or other factors that vitiate the free will. (3) The NLRC correctly gave credence to petitioner’s allegation that Mr. Tecson demanded her resignation. (4) The delay in filing the complaint for illegal dismissal cannot be taken against her as the same was filed within the prescriptive period allowed by law to file such actions.”

The court held:

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“The petition lacks merit.

The primary issue in the case at bar is factual: whether petitioner was constructively dismissed. Petitioner claims that her separation from employment was a case of constructive dismissal. On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner voluntarily resigned.

Petitioner argues that the employer bears the burden of proof that the resignation is voluntary and not the product of coercion or intimidation. We agree that in termination cases, burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.¹⁹ InMobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad,²⁰ the Court ruled that should an employer interpose the defense of resignation, as in the present case, it is still incumbent upon respondent company to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned.

From the totality of evidence on record, it was clearly demonstrated that respondent Cinderella has sufficiently discharged its burden to prove that petitioner’s resignation was voluntary. In voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.²¹ To determine whether the employee indeed intended to relinquish such employment, the act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered.²²

Petitioner relinquished her position when she submitted the letters of resignation. The resignation letter submitted on February 15, 2000 confirmed the earlier resignation letter she submitted on February 7, 2000. The resignation letter contained words of gratitude which can hardly come from an employee forced to resign.²³

The NLRC cannot disregard the resignation letter dated February 15, 2000 on the allegation that its submission was a product of an unintelligent and confused decision due to the disdain shown by Mr. Tecson absent any sufficient proof of force or intimidation. Likewise, it was erroneous for the Labor Arbiter not to give evidentiary weight on the resignation letter on the ground that it was fabricated as it was not signed by petitioner. A careful scrutiny of the said letter shows that it bears the signature of petitioner. More importantly, petitioner admitted having submitted the said letter, albeit, due to an alleged intimidation.

Subsequently, petitioner stopped reporting for work although she met with the officers of the corporation to settle her accountabilities but never raised the alleged intimidation employed on her. Also, though the complaint was filed within the 4-year prescriptive period, its belated filing supports the contention of respondent that it was a mere afterthought.²⁴ Taken together, these circumstances are substantial proof that petitioner’s resignation was voluntary.

Hence, petitioner cannot take refuge in the argument that it is the employer who bears the burden of proof that the resignation is voluntary and not the product of coercion or intimidation. Having submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon her to prove that the resignation was not voluntary but was actually a case of constructive dismissal²⁵with clear, positive, and convincing evidence.²⁶ Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of constructive dismissal.

Petitioner contends there was an orchestrated plan to intimidate her into resigning to exculpate other officers of the company from the anomaly; and that in the course of the internal investigation, Mr. Tecson forced her to resign by saying, "Mag-resign ka na. Maiipit kami." Allegedly, this caused confusion and fear which led to her uninformed decision of tendering the resignation letter on February 15, 2000.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that it was grave error on the part of the NLRC to rely on the allegation that Mr. Tecson threatened and forced petitioner to resign. Other than being unsubstantiated and self-serving, the allegation does not suffice to support the finding of force, intimidation, and ultimately constructive dismissal.

Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.²⁷In St. Michael Academy v. National Labor Relations Commission,²⁸ we ruled that mere allegations of threat or force do not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation. We enumerated the requisites for intimidation to vitiate consent as follows:

(1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property. x x x²⁹

None of the above requisites was established by petitioner. Other than the allegation that Mr. Tecson intimidated petitioner into resigning, there were no other proofs presented to support a finding of forced resignation to stand against respondent’s denial and proof against dismissal. Neither can we consider the conduct of audits and other internal investigations as a form of harassment against petitioner. Said investigation was legitimate and justified, conducted in view of the discovery of the anomalous transaction involving the employees of the respondent including petitioner.

Moreover, we note that petitioner is holding a managerial position with a salary of P27,000.00 a month. Hence, she is not an ordinary employee with limited understanding such that she would be easily maneuvered or coerced to resign against her will.³⁰ Thus, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals that petitioner voluntarily resigned and was not constructively dismissed by respondent.” (Underscoring added)

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Ma. Finina E. Vicente vs. The Hon. Court Of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 175988,  August 24, 2007

Read the full text of the case here.

Bred-In-The-Bone “Epal” Style of Stumping Keeps Roxas Flailing out of the Water.

“Christmas in Lent: Roxas togive P4B for survivors” reads the Inquirer headline of an article by Marlon Ramos, a Philippine Daily Inquirer columnist. Something is egregiously wrong with this headline. It sounds as though Mar Roxas is giving away his own money out of his generosity. This is the same poor and inflammatory bred-in-the-bone “epal” style of stumping. It unwittingly or wittingly offends the taxpayers, who now more than ever feel pained by the brazen raid of public coffers, courtesy of PDAF and DAP.

And it does not stop there. Roxas, the disconnected politico that he is, waltzed with this anomaly as he handed over to the local officials of his home province, Capiz, 200 million in rehabilitation aid, saying: “Advance Happy Easter. May you spend your money wisely to help your [constituents].”  Really, this is how irresponsibly inept or helpless the government is in ensuring that taxpayers’ money, as this 200 million pesos, is spent as planned and approved?

He should have said anything to the effect that the Commission on Audit (COA) will be hot on their trail in seeing to it that those funds are spent as intended, otherwise the Ombudsman will be all over them, and will definitely file cases against those found responsible—clearly the thrust that the administration, at least, is projecting, so why not reinforce it.

While he later warned politicians against epal or credit-grabbing stunts, as embellishing projects with their names, he was up front doing it. That he further warned that Pnoy would be closely monitoring the use of funds, mattered less, because he overshadowed it with his shadowy remarks.

I don’t want to go as far as to say that this is intended or meant as coming from his gut, but his handlers have to manage these political miscues if they were to succeed in rebuilding his sullied political image.

The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction: When validly applied.

While the law allows us to reap the benefits of doing business as a corporation, the corporation must exist for a legitimate purpose and operation, other than the purpose of simply avoiding paying what would otherwise be proper taxes due it.

In the case discussed below Norton and Harrison Company was made liable for taxes it claimed were due to Jackbilt, another corporation all of whose stocks Norton and Harrison purchased during the period subject of assessment. In so holding, the Court explained:

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It has been settled that the ownership of all the stocks of a corporation by another corporation does not necessarily breed an identity of corporate interest between the two companies and be considered as a sufficient ground for disregarding the distinct personalities (Liddell & Co., Inc. v. Coll. of Int. Rev. L-9687, June 30, 1961).

However, in the case at bar, we find sufficient grounds to support the theory that the separate identities of the two companies should be disregarded. Among these circumstances, which we find not successfully refuted by appellee Norton are:

(a) Norton and Harrison owned all the outstanding stocks of Jackbilt; of the 15,000 authorized shares of Jackbilt on March 31, 1958, 14,993 shares belonged to Norton and Harrison and one each to seven others;

 (b) Norton constituted Jackbilt's board of directors in such a way as to enable it to actually direct and manage the other's affairs by making the same officers of the board for both companies. For instance, James E. Norton is the President, Treasurer, Director and Stockholder of Norton. He also occupies the same positions in Jackbilt corporation, the only change being, in the Jackbilt, he is merely a nominal stockholder. The same is true with Mr. Jordan, F. M. Domingo, Mr. Mantaring, Gilbert Golden and Gerardo Garcia, while they are merely employees of the North they are Directors and nominal stockholders of the Jackbilt;

(c) Norton financed the operations of the Jackbilt, and this is shown by the fact that the loans obtained from the RFC and Bank of America were used in the expansion program of Jackbilt, to pay advances for the purchase of equipment, materials rations and salaries of employees of Jackbilt and other sundry expenses. There was no limit to the advances given to Jackbilt so much so that as of May 31, 1956, the unpaid advances amounted to P757,652.45, which were not paid in cash by Jackbilt, but was offset by shares of stock issued to Norton, the absolute and sole owner of Jackbilt;

(d) Norton treats Jackbilt employees as its own. Evidence shows that Norton paid the salaries of Jackbilt employees and gave the same privileges as Norton employees, an indication that Jackbilt employees were also Norton's employees. Furthermore service rendered in any one of the two companies were taken into account for purposes of promotion;

(e) Compensation given to board members of Jackbilt, indicate that Jackbilt is merely a department of Norton.

The income tax return of Norton for 1954 shows that as President and Treasurer of Norton and Jackbilt, he received from Norton P56,929.95, but received from Jackbilt the measly amount of P150.00, a circumstance which points out that remuneration of purported officials of Jackbilt are deemed included in the salaries they received from Norton.

The same is true in the case of Eduardo Garcia, an employee of Norton but a member of the Board of Jackbilt. His Income tax return for 1956 reveals that he received from Norton in salaries and bonuses P4,220.00, but received from Jackbilt, by way of entertainment, representation, travelling and transportation allowances P3,000.00. However, in the withholding statement (Exh. 28-A), it was shown that the total of P4,200.00 and P3,000.00 (P7,220.00) was received by Garcia from Norton, thus portraying the oneness of the two companies.

The Income Tax Returns of Albert Golden and Dioscoro Ramos both employees of Norton but board members of Jackbilt, also disclose the game method of payment of compensation and allowances. The offices of Norton and Jackbilt are located in the same compound. Payments were effected by Norton of accounts for Jackbilt and vice versa. Payments were also made to Norton of accounts due or payable to Jackbilt and vice versa.

Norton and Harrison, while not denying the presence of the set up stated above, tried to explain that the control over the affairs of Jackbilt was not made in order to evade payment of taxes; that the loans obtained by it which were given to Jackbilt, were necessary for the expansion of its business in the manufacture of concrete blocks, which would ultimately benefit both corporations; that the transactions and practices just mentioned, are not unusual and extraordinary, but pursued in the regular course of business and trade; that there could be no confusion in the present set up of the two corporations, because they have separate Boards, their cash assets are entirely and strictly separate; cashiers and official receipts and bank accounts are distinct and different; they have separate income tax returns, separate balance sheets and profit and loss statements.

These explanations notwithstanding an over-all appraisal of the circumstances presented by the facts of the case, yields to the conclusion that the Jackbilt is merely an adjunct, business conduit or alter ego, of Norton and Harrison and that the fiction of corporate entities, separate and distinct from each, should be disregarded. This is a case where the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, should be made to apply. In the case of Liddell & Co. Inc. v. Coll. of Int. Rev., supra, it was held:

There are quite a series of conspicuous circumstances that militates against the separate and distinct personality of Liddell Motors Inc., from Liddell & Co. We notice that the bulk of the business of Liddell & Co. was channel Red through Liddell Motors, Inc. On the other hand, Liddell Motors Inc. pursued no activities except to secure cars, trucks, and spare parts from Liddell & Co., Inc. and then sell them to the general public. These sales of vehicles by Liddell & Co, to Liddell Motors. Inc. for the most part were shown to have taken place on the same day that Liddell Motors, Inc. sold such vehicles to the public. We may even say that the cars and trucks merely touched the hands of Liddell Motors, Inc. as a matter of formality.

x x x

Accordingly, the mere fact that Liddell & Co. and Liddell Motors, Inc. are corporations owned and controlled by Frank Liddell directly or indirectly is not by itself sufficient to justify the disregard of the separate corporate identity of one from the other. There is however, in this instant case, a peculiar sequence of the organization and activities of Liddell Motors, Inc.

As opined in the case of Gregory v. Helvering "the legal right of a tax payer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted". But as held in another case, "where a corporation is a dummy, is unreal or a sham and serves no business purpose and is intended only as a blind, the corporate form may be ignored for the law cannot countenance a form that is bald and a mischievous fictions".

... a taxpayer may gain advantage of doing business thru a corporation if he pleases, but the revenue officers in proper cases, may disregard the separate corporate entity where it serves but as a shield for tax evasion and treat the person who actually may take benefits of the transactions as the person accordingly taxable.

... to allow a taxpayer to deny tax liability on the ground that the sales were made through another and distinct corporation when it is proved that the latter is virtually owned by the former or that they are practically one and the same is to sanction a circumvention of our tax laws. (and cases cited therein.)

In the case of Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-13203, Jan. 28, 1961, this Court made a similar ruling where the circumstances of unity of corporate identities have been shown and which are identical to those obtaining in the case under consideration. Therein, this Court said:

We are, however, inclined to agree with the court below that SM was actually owned and controlled by petitioner as to make it a mere subsidiary or branch of the latter created for the purpose of selling the vehicles at retail (here concrete blocks) ... .

It may not be amiss to state in this connection, the advantages to Norton in maintaining a semblance of separate entities. If the income of Norton should be considered separate from the income of Jackbilt, then each would declare such earning separately for income tax purposes and thus pay lesser income tax. The combined taxable Norton-Jackbilt income would subject Norton to a higher tax. Based upon the 1954-1955 income tax return of Norton and Jackbilt (Exhs. 7 & 8), and assuming that both of them are operating on the same fiscal basis and their returns are accurate, we would have the following result: Jackbilt declared a taxable net income of P161,202.31 in which the income tax due was computed at P37,137.00 (Exh. 8); whereas Norton declared as taxable, a net income of P120,101.59, on which the income tax due was computed at P25,628.00. The total of these liabilities is P50,764.84. On the other hand, if the net taxable earnings of both corporations are combined, during the same taxable year, the tax due on their total which is P281,303.90 would be P70,764.00. So that, even on the question of income tax alone, it would be to the advantages of Norton that the corporations should be regarded as separate entities.
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CIR vs. Norton and Harrison Company

Read the case here.

Execution Sale, When Postponement Valid

The condition for the postponement of execution sale (auction sale) to satisfy a judgment must be met. Otherwise, the sale must push through, and a sale at any other date is a nullity.

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As correctly pointed out by the respondent court (and the trial court), the proper notice and publication in a newspaper was made for the sale at public auction scheduled for March 27, 1971. On motion, however, of private respondents, the trial court in an Order dated March 26, 1971, directed the sale set for March 27, 1971 postponed provided the movant would pay the publication fees, otherwise the public auction would continue at a date to be designated by the Sheriff. The movant did not pay the publication fees hence there was no postponement of the public auction sale since the condition precedent or suspensive condition (that of paying the publication fees) was not complied with. ⁷ There was therefore no valid postponement of the public auction sale. And there was no written consent of debtor and creditor and neither was there any agreement in writing by the parties authorizing the sheriff or the officer making the sale to adjourn the same "to any date agreed upon in writing by the parties." ⁸

The public auction sale set for March 27, 1971, should have been held considering that the said schedule complied with all the requirements of law regarding a public sale, including notice and publication. The officer may adjourn the sale from day to day if it is necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the date fixed in the notice. ⁹ But he may not adjourn to another date unless with the written consent of the parties. ¹⁰ This was precisely the point of the appellate court when it stressed the fact that there was no written agreement between the debtor and the creditor to postpone the sale, and in fact there was no sale held on the scheduled date ¹¹ to warrant the application of Section 24, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Considering, therefore, that there was no valid postponement of the original date of the auction sale on March 27, 1971, "then the alleged public auction sale on July 16, 1971 or close to four months after the original date of sale on March 27, 1971 without the proper notice and publication is null and void" as correctly pointed out by the respondent court. ¹²

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JOSE ABROGAR, et al. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, et al., G.R. No. L-67970 January 15, 1988

Read the full text of the case here.

 

Award of Attorney’s Fees

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With respect to the award of attorney's fees to respondents, no sufficient basis was established for the grant thereof.

It is well settled that attorney's fees should not be awarded in the absence of stipulation except under the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As we have held in Rizal Surety and Insurance Company v. Court of Appeals:²³

Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorney's fees to be awarded by a court when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought. While judicial discretion is here extant, an award thereof demands, nevertheless, a factual, legal or equitable justification. The matter cannot and should not be left to speculation and conjecture (Mirasol vs. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 337; Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619).

In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis for sustaining the award for attorney's fees and to adjudge its payment by petitioner. x x x.

Likewise, this Court held in Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that:

"In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 67970, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 57], the Court had occasion to state that '[t]he reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision, otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal.' x x x."²⁴

Spouses Francisco M. Hernandez, et al. v. Spouses Lorenzo Dolor, et al.,  G.R. No. 160286, July 30, 2004

Read the full text of the case here.

Spouse, Legitimate and Illegitimate Descendants are Entitled to Moral Damages for One's Death. When may be denied.

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As to the amount of moral damages which was awarded to respondents, a review of the records of this case shows that there exists no cogent reason to overturn the action of the appellate court on this aspect.

Under Article 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish for the death of the deceased." The reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained, thus:

. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.¹⁹

Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow the former to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.²⁰

Truly, the pain of the sudden loss of one's offspring, especially of a son who was in the prime of his youth, and who holds so much promise waiting to be fulfilled is indeed a wellspring of intense pain which no parent should be made to suffer. While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical calculation,²¹ we hold that the Court of Appeals' award of moral damages of P100,000.00 each to the Spouses Dolor and Spouses Valmocina for the death of their respective sons, Boyet Dolor and Oscar Valmocina, is in full accord with prevailing jurisprudence.²²

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Spouses Francisco M. Hernandez, et al. v. Spouses Lorenzo Dolor, et al.,  G.R. No. 160286, July 30, 2004

Read the full text of the case here.

An Employer is Solidarily Liable with the Employee for Damages Caused by the Latter

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Petitioners contend that the absence of the Hernandez spouses inside the passenger jeepney at the time of the collision militates against holding them solidarily liable with their co-petitioner, Juan Gonzales, invoking Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable.

The Hernandez spouses argues that since they were not inside the jeepney at the time of the collision, the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which does not provide for solidary liability between employers and employees, should be applied.

We are not persuaded.

Article 2180 provides:

ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, Article 2176 provides –

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

While the above provisions of law do not expressly provide for solidary liability, the same can be inferred from the wordings of the first paragraph of Article 2180 which states that the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Moreover, Article 2180 should be read with Article 2194 of the same Code, which categorically states that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. In other words, the liability of joint tortfeasors is solidary.¹² Verily, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee.¹³

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Spouses Francisco M. Hernandez, et al. v. Spouses Lorenzo Dolor, et al.,  G.R. No. 160286, July 30, 2004

Read the full text of the case here.